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A SURVEY OF STATE COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
 
TAMMY W. COWART* 
PAM GERSHUNY** 
GWENDA BENNETT HAWK*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
State legislatures and Congress have enacted numerous anti-piracy 
copyright statutes protecting sound recordings. Technological developments 
in the early 1970s made duplication of sound recordings both easy and 
inexpensive,1 allowing record pirates to make nearly $100 million dollars for 
sales of duplicated records in 1971.2 In 1972, Congress gave federal 
copyright protection to sound recordings, but all sound recordings made 
before February 15, 1972 remained protected under state law.3 Current law 
mandates that all pre-1972 sound recordings remain protected under state law 
until February 15, 2067.4 At that time, federal law will preempt all state 
copyright law protection, and all pre-1972 sound recordings will enter the 
public domain.5  
In 2009, Congress asked the Register of Copyrights (Copyright Office) 
to study the “desirability and means” of extending federal copyright 
protection to all sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972.6 The 
Copyright Office report on Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound 
Recordings recommended that sound recordings made before February 15, 
1972 be brought into the federal copyright scheme.7  
                                                 
* J.D., Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Tyler. 
** J.D., Professor of Business Law, Southeast Missouri State University.  
*** J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor, Johnson County Community College. 
1 Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Erin Anapol, Federalizing Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: An 
Analysis of the Current Debate, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123, 124 (2012).  
2 Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in a Digital World: Providing Federal Copyright 
Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L.REV. 45, 56-7 (2009).  
3 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
4 Id. 
5 Well known songs such as the Rolling Stones’ “Brown Sugar” (1971), Elvis’ “Hound Dog” 
(1956), and Bing Crosby’s “White Christmas” (1942) as well as many others will all enter the 
public domain on this date. See Gard & Anapol, supra note 1, at 124.  
6 A Study on the Desirability of and Means for Bringing Sound Recordings Fixed Before 
February 15, 1972, Under Federal Jurisdiction, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Dec. 28, 2011), 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound [hereinafter Copyright Office Study]. 
7 Id. 
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This paper examines the persistence of state copyright laws, and the 
extent to which they still exist in light of federal copyright law to further 
understand how those state laws will be affected by possible preemption. 
Specifically, the scheme and penalty of unauthorized duplication and 
bootlegging statutes are examined from all fifty states. We further address 
areas where the Copyright Act would preempt these state laws.   
 
II. HISTORY 
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines “sound recordings” as “works that 
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but 
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or 
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”8 However, sound 
recordings were not a category of works regulated in the previous Copyright 
Act of 1909.9 The Sound Recording Act of 1971 sought to remedy this 
omission and created three categories of sound recording “piracy:” 1) piracy, 
2) counterfeiting, and 3) bootlegging.10 Piracy is the unauthorized duplication 
and sale of sounds contained in a legitimate recording like a compact disc 
(hereinafter “CD”) or cassette tape.11 Counterfeiting is the unauthorized 
duplication and distribution of not only recorded sounds but also the original 
label artwork, trademark, and packaging.12 Bootlegging is the unauthorized 
recording of a live or broadcast performance that is not legitimately 
available, for example that of a live concert or studio out-take that is not 
intended for release.13 United States federal law and most states’ laws 
prohibit all three types of piracy and treat them as criminal offenses.14 
The sound recording industry consists of several players, which include 
primarily record labels, but also disc replicators and manufacturers, artists, 
producers, engineers, and even record stores. Sound recording piracy has 
long adversely affected the recording industry, but the combination of 
                                                 
8 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1978). 
9 Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1909), repealed by Copyright Act 
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1978). 
10 Black’s Law Dictionary actually gives one definition of piracy as, “[t]he unauthorized and 
illegal reproduction or distribution of materials protected by copyright, patent, or trademark 
law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (Pocket ed. 1996). Piratical activity involving sound 
recordings generally falls into one or more of the three categories mentioned. 
11 See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 114 (7th ed. 
1995) [hereinafter KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL]. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 One important issue affecting the constitutionality of anti-piracy laws is whether the three 
types of piracy are “copyright infringement” offenses.  
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technological development and weak laws and/or enforcement has enabled, 
and even encouraged, record pirates to engage in criminal activity. This 
accounts for the annual loss of billions of dollars in displaced sales; in fact, 
one in three music discs sold is piratical.15 In considering federal legislation 
entitled the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982 (hereinafter 
“the 1982 Act”),16 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary agreed with 
Department of Justice testimony that: 
 
Piracy and counterfeiting of copyrighted material, the theft of 
intellectual property, is now a major white-collar crime. The 
dramatic growth of this problem has been encouraged by the huge 
profits to be made, while the relatively lenient penalties provided 
by the current law have done little to stem the tide.17 
 
After the 1982 Act’s passage, Charlie LaRocco (“the legendary ‘Mr. 
Big’ of bootlegging circles”) was arrested for the illegal sale of bootleg 
CDs.18 A New York publication stated that LaRocco’s manufacture and sales 
constituted a multi-million dollar operation, with his third arrest involving 
nearly one million bootleg CDs; still, LaRocco scoffed at the notion that he 
would be punished for his activities.19 Demonstrating the global magnitude 
of the piracy problem, customs officials seized 50,000 pirated CDs, 50,000 
kilograms of polycarbonate material used in making CDs, and 400 CD 
stampers in the Philippines in October of 1998.20 Criminal gangs from Hong 
                                                 
15 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (hereinafter “IFPI”) reported 
$4.6 billion of piratical product sold globally in 2005. See IFPI, The Recording Industry 2005 
Commercial Piracy Report, http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy2005.pdf (visited 
Mar. 11, 2013). See also KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 11, at 115 (stating that for the 
United States in 1987, IFPI reported a $281.7 million loss in sales due to record piracy). In 
2013, the IFPI estimated that nearly a third of all internet users still access unlicensed sites. 
See IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2013.pdf 
(visited Mar. 11, 2013).  
16 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 
(effective May 24, 1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2319 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997)). The ultimate passage of the 1982 Act established a graduated system of criminal 
penalties for copyright infringement of sound recordings and audiovisual works and also 
established a uniform penalty for trafficking in counterfeit labels. See id. 
17 S. REP. NO. 97-274, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 127, 130 (citing Hearings 
on S. 691 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong. 1 (1980) (statement of Renee L. Szybala, Special Assistant to the Associate Attorney 
General, United States Department of Justice)). 
18 William Bastone, Pirate King Music’s No. 1 Bootlegger Gets Busted Again, THE VILLAGE 
VOICE, (Feb. 16, 1999), http://www.villagevoice.com/1999-02-16/news/pirate-king-music-s-
no-1-bootlegger-gets-busted-151-again/. 
19 See id. 
20 See Violence Doesn’t Faze Piracy Fighters, BILLBOARD, Dec. 4, 1999. 
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Kong and China allegedly funded and organized the operation, which 
distributed illegal product to the Philippines, China, and India. Officials from 
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) commented 
that they had even experienced violence while enforcing copyright law in 
other countries.21  
Record pirates used technology developments to produce near-perfect 
copies and/or recordings, which made piracy ever more lucrative.22 The 
development of new recording media such as the digital video (or versatile) 
disc (DVD),23 audio-compression techniques such as MPEG-3 (MP-3),24 and 
peer-to-peer software (P2P)25 enabled users to store a greater amount of 
information in a smaller space and to transmit—“mass-transmit” if you 
will—or share CD-quality music over the Internet at the touch of a button 
(or, the click of a mouse).26 Napster and similar developers (iMesh, Cute 
MX, Gnutella) created programs that searched the Internet for MP-3 music 
files and connected users with those files, regardless of whether the music 
was legitimately available, making hundreds of thousands of such files 
accessible to users for instant download.27 These and other advances made in 
recording technology led to a corresponding increase in the level of piratical 
and counterfeiting activities. 
                                                 
21 See id. 
22 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 93 (1999) [hereinafter SHAPIRO 
& VARIAN] (“Digital copies are perfect copies of the original. . . . Illicit CDs can be stamped 
out for well under a dollar apiece.”). 
23 DVDs are essentially bigger, faster CDs that can hold cinema-like video, better-than-CD 
audio, pictures, and computer data. DVD “became the most successful consumer electronics 
product of all time” less than three years after it was introduced. DVD Association, DVD 
Demystified, http://www.dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html#1.1 (visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
24 MP-3 is defined as a “digital audio file compressed with a standard definition by the Motion 
Pictures Experts Group (MPEG).” What is an mp3?, wiseGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-an-mp3.htm (visited Mar. 12, 2013). Because MP3s 
significantly compress songs, it is a perfect candidate for distributing on the internet. It was 
used early on for widespread piracy. What is Internet Piracy?, wiseGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-internet-piracy.htm, (visited Mar. 12, 2013).  
25 “In a P2P network, the ‘peers’ are computer systems which are connected to each other via 
the Internet. Files can be shared directly between systems on the network without the need of a 
central server. . . . Once connected to the network, P2P software allows you to search for files 
on other people’s computers. Meanwhile, other users on the network can search for files on 
your computer.” Techterms.org, P2P (Peer-To-Peer), http://www.techterms.org/definition/p2p 
(visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
26 Computer users may not consider that copyright law applies to such actions, perhaps 
because of the ease and convenience of using the Internet. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 4 
(1997). 
27 Napster was originally developed to allow users to locate and download music in MP-3 
format from one convenient, easy-to-use interface. See Joan E. Solsman, Remember Napster? 
Rhapsody is refreshing Europe’s Memory, CNET, June 3, 2013, http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1023_3-57587451-93/remember-napster-rhapsody-is-refreshing-europes-memory/. 
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The 2005 year-end anti-piracy statistics published by the Recording 
Industry Association of America, Inc. (hereinafter “RIAA”) show that 
seizure of counterfeit/pirate CDs increased from 246,452 in 2002 to 785,314 
in 2003, a 218.6% increase; and then in 2005 to over 1,338,487, another 60% 
increase.28 The seizure of counterfeit/pirate/bootleg labels increased from 
72,822 in 2002 to 980,308 in 2003 (1306.3% increase) to 4,624,977 in 2004 
(372% increase). This increase in piratical activity has encouraged more 
changes in federal and state laws in an effort to respond adequately to these 
challenges. 
The outlook for digital music has improved recently, however. Global 
music industry revenues rose by 0.3 percent in 2012 to hit $16.5 billion, the 
first year of growth since 1999.29 Digital music revenues also increased by 9 
percent to $5.6 billion.30 Some of this trend may be due to the increased 
enforcement of existing copyright laws. The cyberlocker service Megaupload 
was one of the biggest unlicensed content hosts before it was shut down by 
the FBI in early 2012.31 It was estimated that Megaupload generated $175 
million in revenues and cost the creative industry roughly $500 million in 
damages.32  
 
III. STATE STATUTES 
 
Anti-piracy legislation exists on both the federal and state level. 
Unauthorized duplication statutes and anti-bootlegging laws effectively 
prohibit all forms of piracy.33 These types of laws are intended to aid in the 
investigation and prosecution of record pirates. Congress and state 
legislatures have passed such laws and amended existing laws by 
strengthening penalties and tightening the definitions of offenses. While 
some of these federal and state statutes have passed the constitutionality test, 
some are newer and have not yet been tested. 
                                                 
28 See RIAA, 2005 Year-End Anti-Piracy Statistics, http://76.74.24.142/6BE200AF-5DDA-
1C2B-D8BA-4174680FCE66.pdf (visited March 5, 2013). 
29 IFPI, IFPI publishes Digital Music Report 2013, 
http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_resources/dmr2013.html (visited June 1, 2013).  
30 Id.  
31 IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013: Engine of a digital world, 
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2013.pdf (visited June 1, 2013).  
32 Id.  
33 Recall that counterfeiting is the unauthorized duplication of the sounds contained on a 
phonorecord (piracy) and the unauthorized duplication of the original label artwork, 
trademark, and packaging. Hence, prosecutors can bring charges involving counterfeit product 
under unauthorized duplication laws. They can also charge such defendants under trafficking 
in counterfeit goods statutes and trademark laws. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318, 2320 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997). 
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The following sections address four types of copyright laws by outlining 
the current existence of state statutes and federal law, reviewing the histories 
of their enactments, and addressing any relevant unique elements of the 
particular cause of action. Finally, issues of preemption of state law causes of 
action will be addressed.  
 
A. Unauthorized Duplication 
 
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia currently have statutes 
prohibiting the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings.34 At the federal 
level, copyright protection did not extend to sound recordings until the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971.35 A decade later, Congress passed federal legislation 
specifically prohibiting the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings 
when it enacted the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982.36 
The state statutes are fairly uniform with some notable exceptions. 
Louisiana’s statute specifies that it applies only to sound recordings and not 
to motion pictures or other audiovisual works.37 Louisiana further authorizes 
the court to order the forfeiture or destruction of recordings, labels, and 
devices used to engage in unauthorized duplication,38 as does Missouri.39 
New York authorizes the seizure and destruction of unauthorized recordings, 
but only after the court provides statutory notice to the district attorney and 
the custodian of the seized property within thirty days of the final order.40 If 
the order to destroy the property is carried out, it may not be sold, auctioned 
or further distributed.41   
The Supreme Court’s first opinion on copyright preemption, and 
specifically on unauthorized duplication, occurred under the Copyright Act 
of 1909 (the 1909 Act), which did not have a specific preemption test.42 In 
1971, the government charged defendant Goldstein with violating 
California’s unauthorized duplication statute by copying several musical 
                                                 
34 Of those statutes, forty-four allow for punishment of unauthorized duplication as a felony 
and five limit punishment to that of a misdemeanor. Vermont does not have an unauthorized 
duplication statute, and the Indiana legislature repealed its unauthorized duplication statute 
because its larceny statute covered the same offense. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-4-2, 35-
43-5-2(4) (Michie 1998). 
35 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15, 1972); 
cf. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (including “sound 
recordings” in the list of protectable works of authorship). 
36 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, supra note 16 at § 2319.  
37 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999). 
38 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999). 
39 Id. at 223(5). MO. ANN. STAT. §570.255.2 (1997). 
40 N.Y. PENAL LAW §420.00 (McKinney 1999). 
41 Id.  
42 Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 9.  
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performances from commercially sold recordings without the permission of 
the owner of the master record or tape.43 The defendant moved for dismissal, 
arguing that California’s statute conflicted with the Copyright Clause. Once 
the defendant’s dismissal was denied, he entered pleas of nolo contendere 
and pursued state appellate remedies. The Supreme Court agreed to review 
the defendant’s case after his argument failed in the California courts. In the 
Supreme Court, the defendant again argued that Congress alone had the 
authority to regulate unauthorized duplication via the Constitution’s grant of 
such authority and Congress’ passage of the 1909 Act. The defendant argued 
that either the Copyright Clause or the 1909 Act preempted California’s 
sound recording legislation.44 The Goldstein Court held that the Copyright 
Clause did not preempt the area for the following reasons: state regulation is 
not necessarily inconsistent with providing an incentive to promotion of the 
arts; state protection may provide an incentive where there is no national 
interest (given national diversity); state regulation will not adversely 
influence other states because it will only be effective within its own border; 
and, Congress can always preempt later if the state regulation causes 
problems.45 
The court also found that Congress did not occupy the sound recording 
field with the 1909 Act,46 which originally protected only the lyrics and 
music of a song.47 A sound recording copyright protects the fixed 
performance of the lyrics and music by a particular recording artist.48 In 
effect, Congress’s decision in 1909 not to cover sound recordings meant that 
Congress did not intend to regulate them, but that the states could regulate; it 
did not mean that sound recordings should remain unregulated by either the 
federal or state governments.49 
Although not enacted until 1982, the effective date of the federal 
unauthorized duplication law50 is retroactive, i.e. February 15, 1972.51 It is at 
this point that Congress, under its Copyright Clause authority, occupied the 
field of sound recordings. The existence of a federal law regulating the same 
                                                 
43 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1973). 
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 558-60, 571. 
46 See id. at 570, n.28. 
47 Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 9.  
48 As a simple illustration, Joe writes a song and gives Jane permission to record herself 
performing that song. If Jimmy then wants to record himself performing the same song, he 
must either pay or get permission from Joe, but he does not need to get permission from Jane. 
If Jimmy wants to sell copies of Jane’s performance, he then must obtain Jane’s permission. 
49 See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570. 
50 See Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, supra note 16.  
51 See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, § 3 (effective Feb. 15, 
1972); see also Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 8 (addressing preemption of state laws for 
sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972). 
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activity a state law regulates is sufficient to preempt the use of the state law 
under the Supremacy Clause.52 Thus, state unauthorized duplication laws can 
only apply to sound recordings fixed and released prior to February 15, 
197253 even though few state statutes specify this as the “cut-off” date. The 
federal law governs sound recordings fixed after that date. 
 
B. Anti-Bootlegging 
 
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia currently have anti-
bootlegging statutes.54 Anti-bootlegging statutes benefit performers, as well 
as arenas and promoters, by prohibiting the unauthorized fixation of live 
performances.55 Various definitions imbedded in the Constitution and Title 
17 apply to the controversial term “fixation” and imply that anti-bootlegging 
laws are copyright laws. The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant rights 
to authors for their “Writings”56 and Congress granted such exclusive rights 
in Title 17 of the United States Code.57 Specifically, Section 102 affords 
copyright protection to “Writings” by defining them as “original works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, from which they can be 
communicated either directly or with the aid of a machine.”58 It then lists 
works of authorship, including musical works and sound recordings, but it 
does not include “live performances” in this list of copyrightable works.59 
Title 17 defines a sound recording as a work that results from the 
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.60 Title 17 also states 
that a work is “created” when it is fixed for the first time and that a “work is 
‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than a transitory duration.”61 A live performance is not 
                                                 
52 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 497 (2nd ed. 1998) 
[hereinafter TRIBE]; U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
53 See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571. 
54 Of these statutes, thirty-four allow for punishment of bootlegging as a felony and one limits 
punishment to that of a misdemeanor. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and 
Vermont do not have anti-bootlegging statutes. See, Table of State Copyright Statutes, 
Appendix 1.  
55 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.15-.20 (McKinney 1999). 
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
57 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
58 Id. § 102. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. § 101. 
61 Id. 
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inherently “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” and thus does not 
fall within the subject matter of copyright law as enacted by Congress.62 
State and federal anti-bootlegging statutes protect different interests; 
therefore, the analysis applied by a court considering a violation of a state 
statute can vary considerably from a similar violation under the federal 
version. A New York appellate court upheld the state’s anti-bootlegging 
statute under a Copyright Clause preemption claim in 1980.63 The 
prosecution charged the defendant with numerous counts involving 
unauthorized recording of sound, specifically a 1978 radio broadcast of the 
group Blondie performing works that had not been previously fixed.64 The 
court compared the subject matter protected by the New York anti-
bootlegging statute to the subject matter protected by federal copyright law.65 
It distinguished the two laws by finding that the state statute did not require 
proof that a recording had been fixed.66 It further found that the essence of 
the state anti-bootlegging law was to prohibit the recording of live 
performances without the consent of the performers.67 The court upheld the 
state anti-bootlegging statute because it protected different types of works 
than those the federal copyright law protected.68 
There are other examples as well. Alabama and New Mexico 
specifically provide that the performer is presumed to own the rights to 
record or authorize the recording of the live performance, obviating the need 
to prove the lack of consent.69 Mississippi presumes the performer’s right to 
record the live performance, but also presumes in the same section the 
performer’s right to display and distribute personal images.70 New Jersey’s 
Anti-Piracy Act adds the requirement that the offender have knowledge that 
the live performance has been recorded with the consent of the owner, but 
also allows a law enforcement officer or even a theater employee to detain a 
suspected bootlegger for a reasonable time to recover the illegal recording.71 
New York law provides that it is a third degree felony to operate a recording 
device in a motion picture theater or live theater without the authority of the 
theater operator, not the performer.72 Interestingly, it appears that a plain 
reading of the New York statute would exempt recordings in outdoor venues. 
                                                 
62 Id. § 102. 
63 See People v. M & R Records, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
64 See id. at 847. 
65 See id. at 850. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 ALA. CODE §13A-8-81(3)(e) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-16B-5.C (Michie 1998). 
70 MISS. CODE ANN. §97-23-87(2)(b) (1999). 
71 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:21-21c(3) & g (West 1995). 
72 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.32 (McKinney 1999). 
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One wonders how this works with Good Morning America’s concerts in 
Bryant Park or The Today Show’s concerts in Rockefeller Plaza. 
Furthermore, the violation is elevated to a second degree felony if the 
recording is fifteen minutes or more in length.   
By comparison, in the federal statute, Title 17’s fixation definition also 
states that a work being transmitted is “fixed” if a fixation is being made 
simultaneously with the transmission.73 Artists may authorize certain parties 
to fix the sounds of their performances. The medium upon which those 
parties fix or record the performances then contain a copyrightable work. 
This situation is no different than when a band authorizes its record label to 
record its performance in a recording studio. The sound recordings are 
worthy of the same copyright protection regardless of whether they contain 
studio recordings or live performances, as long as the artist has granted 
fixation permission.74 Legal author Henry H. Perritt, Jr. offers the following 
specific example: 
  
[S]omeone who gives an extemporaneous lecture is not entitled to 
copyright protection in the lecture because there is no fixation, but 
if the lecturer causes someone to record the lecture as it is being 
given, the lecturer enjoys a copyright in the recording (and perhaps 
in the lecture itself). Moreover, if the lecture is being ‘transmitted’ 
at the same time that it is recorded at the direction of the lecturer, 
both the recording and transmitted representation enjoy copyright 
protections (emphasis added).75 
 
Federal copyright law requires authorized fixation before it grants 
protection to any original work of authorship.76 This creates a question about 
whether state anti-bootlegging laws protect the same rights as federal 
copyright laws and may not be preempted by Title 17 or Congress’s 
Copyright Clause authority. 
However, Congress did pass an anti-bootlegging statute in 1994, 
criminalizing 1) the unauthorized fixation of live musical performances; 2) 
the transmission to the public of live musical performances; 3) the 
distribution, sale, or rent of unauthorized fixations of live musical recordings; 
and, 4) trafficking in unauthorized fixations of live musical performances, if 
the actor acted without the consent of the performer, knowingly, and for 
                                                 
73 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
74 See id. (emphasis added). 
75 See HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 68 § 10.5, at 428 
(1996). 
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.77 Previously, the 
1976 Act had provided for civil liability for bootlegging, but explicitly stated 
that the federal law did not preempt state statutes.78 
The Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of the federal anti-
bootlegging law in United States v. Moghadam.79 The defendant in this case 
was one of thirteen convicted after United States Customs confiscated 
approximately 800,000 bootleg CDs with a street value of approximately $20 
million.80 According to the court’s analysis, what little legislative history 
exists suggests that Congress enacted the anti-bootlegging statute under its 
Copyright Clause authority.81 The defendant challenged Congress’s authority 
based on the argument that live performances are not “fixed” as required by 
the Copyright Clause.82 If the Moghadam Court agreed with the defendant 
that live performances were not fixed, it would have to hold that Congress 
exceeded its Copyright Clause authority. However, the Eleventh Circuit 
avoided deciding the fixation issue by considering the situation that arises 
when a federal law is not authorized under the Copyright Clause but is 
authorized under another of Congress’s Constitutional powers.83 
The Moghadam Court concluded that Congress can use its power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate bootlegging activities. Assuming arguendo 
that the law did not satisfy the Copyright Clause requirements for federal 
regulation, the Moghadam Court held that Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power did authorize the law.84 In effect, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
Commerce Clause can provide the source of Congressional power that 
affirms a law’s constitutionality when the “the extension of copyright-like 
protection is not fundamentally inconsistent with the . . . requirement[s] of 
the Copyright Clause.”85 
                                                 
77 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
78 Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 8 at § 1101. 
79 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 
(2000). 
80 See Stan Soocher, Appeals Court Backs Anti-Bootlegging Statute, 15 ENT. L. & FIN. 3 (June 
1999) at 3. 
81 See id. at *8, citing 140 Cong. Rec. H11441, H11457 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994) (statement 
of Rep. Hughes). See also Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords 
Inherent in the Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILLANOVA 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 327 at 356-57 (citing the congressional debate over the federal law and 
discussion of the commercial detriment of bootlegging).  
82 The fixation requirement is embedded in the definition of “Writings,” which is used in the 
Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress is only authorized to protect original 
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See Copyright Act of 
1976, supra note 8. 
83 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273.  
84 See id. at 1277. 
85 Id. at 1281. 
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No other Circuit Courts have decided whether the Commerce Clause or 
the Copyright Clause authorizes Congress’s enactment of the anti-
bootlegging law. On March 27, 2000, the Supreme Court denied writ of 
certiorari in the Moghadam case, allowing the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that 
the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate bootlegging to stand.86 
Although the Eleventh Circuit stated in dicta that it did not think the 
Copyright Clause authorized the federal bootlegging law,87 neither the 
Supreme Court nor any of the Circuit Courts has decided this issue either. 
The determining factor is “fixation”—if the performance of a musical work 
is sufficiently fixed at the point of performance, then the performance is 
protectable as a sound recording under Title 17 and the federal anti-
bootlegging statute applies.88 The federal law thus would preempt state anti-
bootlegging statutes in cases where the performance was fixed on or after 
February 15, 1972, the date Congress extended copyright protection to sound 
recordings.89 However, as long as the Supreme Court allows the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Moghadam holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress’s enactment of 2319A, to stand, courts are free to decide the issue 
otherwise.90 Such exercise of the Commerce Clause power in combination 
with the Supremacy Clause allows Congress to regulate unauthorized 
fixations.91 The existence of a federal law regulating the same activity a state 
law regulates is sufficient to preempt the use of the state law;92 therefore, the 
federal anti-bootlegging law preempts state statutes at the time of its 
enactment in 1994.93  
Two more recent district court decisions have renewed the debate over 
the constitutionality of anti-bootlegging laws. In KISS v. Catalog Passport 
Int’l Prods., Inc., and United States v. Martignon, the district courts held that 
the federal bootlegging laws exceed Congress’s authority under the 
Copyright Clause.94 The decisions dramatically contradict the Eleventh 
                                                 
86 Id.; see United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 
1036 (2000). 
87 See id. at 1273. 
88 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
89 See Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 35; see also Copyright Act of 1976, supra 
note 8 (addressing preemption of state laws for sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 
1972). 
90 See Moghadam,175 F.3d at 1269. 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
92 See TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-27, at 497. 
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
94 See KISS v. Catalog Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004) and 
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, (S.D.N.Y. 2004), respectively. See also 
David Patton, The Correct-Like Decision in United States v. Martignon, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1287, 1298-99 (2006); Andrew B. Peterson, To Bootleg or Not to 
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Circuit’s Moghadam decision. A current issue of scholarly debate is whether 
or not Congressional power to legislate in the area of intellectual property 
should be cabined by the 23 words of the Copyright Clause.95  
 
C. True Name and Address 
 
A third type of state copyright legislation is known as “true name and 
address” legislation. A true name and address statute regulates the replication 
process and distribution of sound recordings.96 Although applicable to both 
legitimate and illegitimate products, the statute is designed to prevent the 
distribution of illegal sound recording products.97 Forty-six states and the 
District of Columbia have true name and address statutes.98 There is no 
federal true name and address statute, so there are no real preemption issues 
here. 
Statutes generally require that an in-state manufacturer include its actual 
name and the state where the product was manufactured99 on the product’s 
                                                                                                                   
Bootleg? Confusion Surrounding the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues, 
58 OKLA. L. REV. 723 (2005). 
95 The constitutional basis for both Congressional enactments come from two clauses in 
Article I Section 8: the Commerce Clause and the Copyright Clause. A current area of debate 
among Constitutional law scholars is whether the commerce clause provides this authority. 
See Brian Danitz, Martignon and KISS Catalog: Can Live Performances Be Protected?, 15 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2005); Angela T. Howe, Annual Review 
2005: Part II: Entertainment Law and New Media: VIII: Entertainment & Constitutional Law: 
a Note: United States v. Martignon & KISS Catalog v. Passport International Products: The 
Anti-Bootlegging Statute and the Collision of International Intellectual Property Law and the 
United States Constitution, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, (2005); William Patry, The 
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: an Imminent Constitutional 
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394-97 (1999),; contra. Joseph C. Merschman, 
Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run 
Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661, (Winter, 2002). This 
paper adopts the position taken by Patry and others, that the Rehnquist Court rejected the 
notion that Congress’s enumerated powers are hermetically sealed.  
96 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653w (West 1999). It is notable that North Carolina includes 
software programmers in its true name & address statute, but does not require software 
producers to disclose the name of their programmers. N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-435(a) & (b) 
(1993). 
97 See Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 102 (9th Cir. 1994). 
98 Of those laws, thirty-seven allow for punishment of a violation as a felony and nine limit 
punishment to that of a misdemeanor. The New Hampshire statute does not specify penalties 
for true name and address violations. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352-A:3 (1995). Hawaii, 
Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming are the only states without true name and address statutes. 
99 Note the difference between “replication” and “manufacture.” The true manufacturer of a 
sound recording is the holder of the master recording, usually the record label. A master 
recording goes through a process in which the manufacturer may create (or cause the creation 
of) many intermittent components before finally finishing with the product that will then be 
replicated for distribution. Additional “pressings” ordered by the manufacturer would then 
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label, and that all sound recording products transferred commercially within 
the state contain the actual name and address of its manufacturer, whether in-
state or out-of-state. If an illegitimate manufacturer includes its own true 
name and address on the product replicated and that product is confiscated, 
the manufacturer is in compliance with the true name and address statute. 
However, law enforcement will be able to use the true name and address on 
the product to obtain an affidavit from the actual copyright owner that the 
owner did not license to the “manufacturer.” Then either the state or federal 
government can choose to charge the manufacturer under the applicable anti-
piracy law (for example, unauthorized duplication or anti-bootlegging). If a 
pirate tries to avoid such detection by not including its true name and address 
(it may include a false name or address, like the name and address of the 
sound recording owner-record label, or it may omit certain information), the 
state may charge the manufacturer under the true name and address statute 
without having to prove whether the replication of the recording is 
authorized. This type of statute thus allows for simpler prosecution of record 
pirates. Prosecutors do not have to call expert witnesses to examine the 
validity of the sound recording, and artists or record labels who own the 
copyright do not have to appear in court to testify whether or not they 
authorized the replication. There is no rational reason for a legitimate 
manufacturer to avoid including the true name and address on a product’s 
label. All products should clearly display the true name and address on their 
outside labels such that prosecutors can charge the manufacturers with either 
unauthorized duplication or violation of the true name and address statute for 
any illegitimate product that is replicated within the state or that is in 
commerce in the state. 
The first decision addressing the constitutionality of California’s true 
name and address statute was People v. Anderson,100 in which a California 
appellate court found the defendant guilty of violating the state’s true name 
and address statute.101 In the case that followed, Anderson v. Nidorf, the 
defendant argued that federal copyright law preempted California’s statute.102 
                                                                                                                   
merely need to be replicated, rather than proceeding through the entire manufacturing process. 
Each type of media has its own manufacturing process. In this case, the word “replication” is 
used to refer to the actual duplication, or copying, of the product and the word “manufacturer” 
is used to refer to the holder of a master or the person who orders the replication of a sound 
recording. Legitimate manufacturers are those parties who own the right to copy either 
because they are the initial owner of the right (record labels) or because the owner has issued 
to them a license of that right.  
100 People v. Anderson, 235 Cal. App. 3d 586 (1991). 
101 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653w (West 1999). 
102 Anderson, 26 F.3d at 101. The defendant also argued that the statute violated the First 
Amendment. In response, the court noted that the statutes can be narrowly designed to serve a 
particular public need. The court concluded that California had a compelling interest in 
protecting the public from being victimized by false and deceptive commercial practices such 
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Preemption is appropriate when a state creates legal or equitable rights 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within Section 301.103 One of the 
purposes of federal copyright law is to protect the rights of copyright owners; 
California’s true name and address statute shares that purpose, but also has a 
consumer protection purpose.104 According to the California court, federal 
copyright law does not share this consumer protection purpose.105 Further, 
California’s statute prohibits the selling of labels that do not disclose the 
“true name and address” of the manufacturer; it does not prohibit copyright 
infringement.106 The court held that federal copyright laws do not protect 
equivalent rights and thus do not preempt the state statute.107 
A New York court similarly resolved a case challenging the New York 
true name and address statute.108 The defendants in this case were charged 
under New York’s unauthorized duplication,109 anti-bootlegging,110 and true 
name and address statutes. The court upheld the constitutionality of New 
York’s true name and address statute and stated, “[i]ndeed careful 
examination of Section 275.15 establishes that it is not a copyright statute, 
but rather a consumer protection statute enacted to protect the public from 
purchasing records under a false belief that they were, in fact, recorded by 
the performer or group named on the record jacket.”111 
In a case involving the distribution of unidentified video cassettes, the 
New York true name and address statute again passed the constitutionality 
test.112 The court discussed federal copyright law’s Section 301 preemption 
test, which allows for preemption of state statutes that regulate an equivalent 
                                                                                                                   
as piracy of legitimate music industry product. Additionally, the court reasoned that the 
“speech at issue is deemed as commercial speech, which is subject to less severe scrutiny than 
other forms of protected communication.” The court stated that where commercial speech is 
affected, the state need only show a reasonable relationship between the statute and the state's 
interest in preventing deception of consumers. See id. 
103 See Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 8. 
104 See Anderson, 26 F.3d at 102. The federal copyright law protects the rights of copyright 
owners because it is an incentive to them to continue creating and sharing their works with the 
public. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to enact laws that “promote the 
progress of Science and the Useful Arts”). 
105 See Anderson, 26 F.3d at 102. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See People v. M & R Records, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
109 The recordings involved were fixed before February 15, 1972; thus, the federal 
unauthorized duplication law did not yet apply and did not preempt use of the state statute. See 
id. at 847. 
110 The bootleg recordings involved were created in 1978, prior to the existence of the federal 
anti-bootlegging law. See id. 
111 Id. at 850. 
112 People v. Borriello, 588 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1992). 
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right with respect to a work of authorship protectable under copyright law.113 
Again the court sustained the true name and address statute, holding that 
copyright infringement was not an element of an offense under the true name 
and address statute and therefore, the statute did not affect equivalent rights 
within the scope of federal copyright law.114 
Other state courts have addressed the constitutionality of their true name 
and address statutes. A Maryland appeals court upheld its true name and 
address statute due to the statute’s consumer protection purpose.115 The 
Georgia Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal for the purpose of 
deciding whether the state’s law requiring a label bearing the name and 
address of the “transferor” of a sound recording was preempted by the 
Copyright Act.116 It decided that the labeling requirement added an extra 
element and precluded preemption. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to a 
Washington court of appeals case in which the court also upheld the true 
name and address statute’s constitutionality under the defendant’s Copyright 
Clause preemption challenge because the Washington statute contained an 
“extra element” to that of copyright infringement—failure to disclose the 
origin of a recording.117 
 
D. Optical Disc Identification 
 
Optical disc identification legislation (hereinafter “ODIL”) is important 
as a non-technical answer to a technology-driven problem. The term “optical 
disc” includes digital storage formats such as audio CD, video CD (VCD), 
CD-read only memory (CD-ROM), and digital versatile disc (DVD). 
Virtually the same technology and equipment are used to create the master 
versions of all optical disc formats.118 The digital format allows for high-
quality, near-exact replication of the masters, and of copies of the masters, in 
mass quantities.119 
Optical disc piracy is often associated with organized crime and has 
become increasingly mobile, enabling wrongdoers to move around to avoid 
detection and to take advantage of territories where enforcement is less 
effective.120 Thus, optical disc piracy has become a global problem. Further, 
                                                 
113 Id. at 994. 
114 Id. at 995-96. 
115 See Hicks v. State, 674 A.2d 55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
116 Briggs v. State, 638 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. 2006).  
117 See State v. Awawdeh, 864 P.2d 965 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 441 
(1994). 
118 Users need only make relatively minor modifications to CD-mastering and CD-replicating 
equipment to use the same equipment to master or replicate CD-ROMs or DVDs. 
119 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 22, at 93. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. 
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facilities for mastering and replication may be totally devoted to 
unauthorized activity or may supplement income from legitimate activity 
with infringing production, making it difficult for investigators to trace the 
source of piratical activity. ODIL provides investigators with the necessary 
tools that lead to the successful prosecution of intellectual property pirates. 
There is no federal ODIL at this point, but three states have enacted ODIL: 
California,121 Florida,122 and New York.123 
ODIL requires in-state replicators124 to permanently mark every optical 
disc containing sound recordings that it replicates with a unique identifier.125 
If a replicator includes such an identifying mark on an illegitimate product 
and that product is confiscated, law enforcement will know where to begin 
the search for the record pirate, which may be a party beyond the replicator, 
like a customer-manufacturer. Then the prosecutor may charge the pirate 
under the relevant anti-piracy statute (federal or state unauthorized 
duplication, for example). If a replicator does not properly mark optical 
discs, the state may charge the replicator under ODIL without having to 
prove whether the replication of the recording is legitimate and can still bring 
charges against the replicator under the more traditional anti-piracy laws. 
Like true name and address statutes, ODIL allows for simpler prosecution of 
record pirates. It also provides additional motivation for replicators to verify 
the legitimacy of its customers’ orders. 
ODIL encourages replicators to make sure that any replication orders 
they receive from customers are accompanied by the proper licenses that 
grant the customers permission to make copies. If law enforcement traces an 
illegitimate copy to a replicator, the replicator should provide evidence that 
replication rights were granted by the copyright owner. If the replicator does 
not have this evidence, the replicator may be guilty of unauthorized 
duplication. Presumably, law enforcement will seek to contact the customer 
who placed the order and include the customer as a party to piracy. In effect, 
ODIL should limit the number of replicators that will be willing to provide 
                                                 
121 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 21800-21806 (West Supp. 5A 1999). 
122 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5615 (West 2000). 
123 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 390-a (McKinney 2000). 
124 Note here again the difference between “replicator” and “manufacturer.” See supra note 99. 
ODIL uses the term “manufacturer,” but defines it to mean “a person who replicates the 
physical optical disc or produces the master used in any optical disc replication process.” CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21802. This paper will continue to use the term “replicator” to refer to 
the party that must comply with ODIL. See also Larry Jaffee, CA Law Requires ID on Discs, 
REPLICATIONNEWS Dec. 1998, at 1, 68 (discussing California’s ODIL and referring to the 
language “manufacturers,” but discussing the responsibilities of “replicators”). 
125 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21800 (West 1999). California recently amended its 
ODIL laws to authorize law enforcement to inspect commercial disc manufacturing facilities, 
without a warrant or prior notice, to ensure they are properly marking the discs. CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 21803 (West 1999) (as amended effective Jan. 1, 2012).   
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illegal services to customers. Replicators then hold the responsibility for 
ensuring that only legitimate product leaves their factories. All optical discs 
replicated after the effective date of a state’s ODIL should contain the unique 
identifier so that prosecutors can charge the replicators with either 
unauthorized duplication or ODIL violations for any illegitimate product that 
leaves the factory. Further, commercial replicators should stop taking 
illegitimate orders from customers in an effort to protect themselves from 
ODIL or other anti-piracy lawsuits. 
It is obvious that ODIL creates a burden on in-state replicators by 
requiring them to mark optical discs with a permanent126 and unique 
identifier. The in-state burden exists also in that some manufacturer-
customers do not want the replicators’ names on their optical discs.127 Those 
manufacturers may hire out-of-state replicators located in states without 
ODIL to perform their pressings.128 
ODIL not only requires in-state replicators to comply, but also may 
require that optical discs distributed in the state’s commerce comply.129 If so, 
out-of-state replicators must also mark their products with unique identifiers 
if they know or intend that their product will enter the “stream of commerce” 
in one of the ODIL states. In-state and out-of-state replicators may have to 
reconfigure their pressing machines and other mastering and replicating 
equipment to create a way to permanently mark optical discs. This burden is 
actually smaller than it appears. 
Commercial mastering and replication facilities already voluntarily 
participate in optical disc identification. The IFPI and Philips Consumer 
Electronics have developed the Source Identification (hereinafter, “SID”) 
Code to “enhance the security of CD manufacturing at both the mastering 
and replication stages.”130 Under the SID Code system, there are two codes: a 
Laser Beam Recorder Code, which identifies the plant that manufactured the 
master, and a Mould Code, which identifies the plant that replicated the 
                                                 
126 A permanent mark could conceivably include a mark made by a permanent marker; thus, 
independent artists who replicate their own optical discs using generic commercial equipment 
like CD-burners may comply by hand-writing their identifiers on their optical discs. 
127 See Larry Jaffee, supra note 124. 
128 See id. (revealing that a sales representative of an Austin, Texas replicator has received 
phone calls from California-based brokers inquiring whether they could use its services 
instead of using those of their regular California replicators). 
129 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 21805 (West 1999) (“Any person who buys, sells, 
receives, transfers, or possesses for purposes of sale or rental an optical disc knowing that the 
identification mark required by this chapter has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, or 
destroyed, or knowing it was manufactured in California without the required identification 
mark . . . is guilty.”). 
130 IFPI, SID Code Implementation Guide, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/sid-code-
implementation-guide.pdf (visited Mar. 12, 2013).  
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disc.131 According to the IFPI, SID Codes have been allocated to about 80 
percent of the world’s 484 known CD plants and account for about 96 
percent of the world’s identifiable manufacturing capacity.132 Compliance 
with ODIL should only be a burden for the remaining 20 percent of the 
world’s known CD plants and 4 percent of the world’s identifiable 
manufacturing capacity. Those facilities that do not participate in the SID 
Code program are more likely to be involved in illegitimate replication. Thus 
as with the true name and address statutes, the burden ODIL creates is most 
borne by those participating in illegal unauthorized duplication.  
ODIL is also similar to true name and address laws in that it may help to 
protect the public, although California’s state legislative history does not 
mention such an intent.133 Unlike true name and address statutes, ODIL does 
not provide customers with a name and address to contact the manufacturer if 
an optical disc is unsatisfactory; ODIL assists law enforcement in locating 
the source of illegitimate product, action that only indirectly benefits 
consumers. However, there should be no Copyright Clause preemption 
problem in applying state ODIL because it does not cover an equivalent right 
protected under federal Copyright Law, as discussed previously in other true 
name and address cases.134 Therefore, these statutes apply to all sound 
recordings, regardless of whether replication of them is authorized or 
unauthorized. Further, they do not attempt to regulate the same activities that 
any federal law regulates; thus, the Supremacy Clause likely does not 
preempt them. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
While § 301 of the Copyright Act is broad and sweeping in scope, it is 
clear that state copyright law is alive and well, at least for now. In addition to 
the four state law claims outlined in this paper, courts have also allowed state 
law claims for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, 
misuse of trade secrets, and right of publicity.135 However, some scholars 
argue that allowing state copyright law claims to proceed interferes with the 
goal of national uniformity in copyright law.136 
                                                 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See California Committee Reports dated 4/21/98 (Assembly), 5/6/98 (Assembly), 6/22/98 
(Senate), 6/30/98 (Senate), and 8/30/98 (Senate). 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 102-117. 
135 Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2007). 
136 Id. at 108.  
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The Senate made the following statement when considering the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, implementing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization treaties: 
 
The copyright industries are one of America’s largest and fastest 
growing economic assets. According to International Intellectual 
Property Alliance statistics, in 1996 (when the last full set of 
figures was available), the U.S. creative industries accounted for 
3.65 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) -- $278.4 
billion. In the last 20 years (1977-1996), the U.S. copyright 
industries’ share of GDP grew more than twice as fast as the 
remainder of the economy -- 5.5 percent vs. 2.6 percent. Between 
1977 and 1996, employment in the U.S. copyright industries more 
than doubled to 3.5 million workers -- 2.8 percent of total U.S. 
employment. Between 1977 and 1996 U.S. copyright industry 
employment grew nearly three times as fast as the annual rate of 
the economy as a whole -- 4.6 percent vs. 1.6 per percent. In fact, 
the copyright industries contribute more to the U.S. economy and 
employ more workers than any single manufacturing sector, 
including chemicals, industrial equipment, electronics, food 
processing, textiles and apparel, and aircraft. More significantly for 
the WIPO treaties, in 1996 U.S. copyright industries achieved 
foreign sales and exports of $60.18 billion, for the first time leading 
all major industry sectors, including agriculture, automobiles and 
auto parts, and the aircraft industry.137 
 
Intellectual property industry groups like the RIAA,138 the Motion 
Picture Association of America, Inc.,139 the Interactive Digital Software 
Association,140 the Software & Information Industry Association,141 and the 
Business Software Alliance,142 are interested in maintaining some level of 
uniformity in national copyright law. Indeed, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this paper, the Copyright Office has recommended that pre-
                                                 
137 S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998). 
138 The RIAA sponsored ODIL in California and New York. Its website is at 
http://www.riaa.com. 
139 The Motion Picture Association of America sponsored ODIL in Florida. Its website is at 
http://www.mpaa.org. 
140 The Interactive Digital Software Association’s website is at http://www.idsa.com. It along 
with the RIAA, the Motion Picture Association of America, and others have all supported the 
passage of California’s ODIL. See Larry Jaffee, supra note 124.  
141 The Software & Information Industry Association website is at http://www.siia.net. It is a 
trade association that represents the interests of the software and digital content industry.  
142 The Business Software Alliance’s website is at http://www.bsa.org. It represents the global 
interests of software publishers.   
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1972 sound recordings be brought under federal jurisdiction before they are 
allowed to enter the public domain in 2067.143 Other scholars have likewise 
argued that the variance in state copyright law term, duration, and fair use 
exceptions leads to confusion among copyright holders if federal law is not 
applied.144 Federal unauthorized duplication and anti-bootlegging laws have 
been important steps toward fighting music piracy that ignores state 
boundaries. However, as pirates continue to take advantage of new 
technologies, state and national boundaries may erode. Thus, the state true 
name and address and ODIL statutes are important tools that investigators 
can use to help identify the source of piratical activity. Prosecutors can use 
these laws to send piracy cases through the state legal system more 
efficiently and with better results. However, these state-specific laws cannot 
effectively fight piracy until every state has such laws or until Congress 
legislates for the nation.  
  
                                                 
143 A Study on the Desirability of and Means for Bringing Sound Recordings Fixed Before 
February 15, 1972, Under Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 6.  
144 See Erlinger, supra note 2 at 67-68; see also Gard & Anapol, supra note 1, at 130. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table of State Copyright Statutes 
State 
Penalty—
Unauthorized 
Duplication 
Unauthorized 
Duplication Bootlegging 
True Name 
& Address 
Optical Disc 
Identification 
Alabama Felony X145 X146 X147 
Alaska Misdemeanor X148 X149 
Arizona Felony X150 X151 X152 
Arkansas Felony X153 X154 X155 
California Felony X156 X157 X158 X159 
Colorado Felony X160 X161 
Connecticut Felony X162 X163 
Delaware Felony X164 X165 
DC Felony X166 X167 X168 
Florida Misdemeanor X169 X170 X171 X172 
                                                 
145 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-81 to -82 (1994).   
146 ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81(a)(2) (1994).   
147 ALA. CODE Sec. 13A-8-83 ; 13A-8-86. 
148 ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.900(a) (Michie 1998).   
149 ALASKA STAT § 45.50.900(a)(2) (Michie 1998). 
150 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).   
151 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(A)(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).   
152 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(A)(3),(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).   
153 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(b) (Michie 1997).   
154 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(b) (Michie 1997).   
155 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-510(c) (Michie 1997).   
156 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1999).   
157 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 653s, 653u (West 1999).   
158 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(w) (West 1999). 
159 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §21800-21807 (West 1999).  
160 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-4-602 to -603 (West 1999).   
161 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-604. 
162 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-142b, -142f (West 1997). 
163 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-142c. 
164 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 920-921 (1995).   
165 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 922(a). 
166 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3814 (1996).   
167 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3814(b) (1996).   
168 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3214.01 (1996). 
169 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11(2)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1997).   
170 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11(2)(a)(3), (3)(a)(2) (West 1997).   
171 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.11(3)(a)(3) (West 1997). 
172 FLA. STAT. ANN. §817.5615 (West 1997). 
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Georgia Felony X173 X174 
Hawaii Felony X175 
Idaho Misdemeanor X176 X177 
Illinois Felony X178 X179 X180 
Indiana Felony X181 X182 
Iowa Felony X183 X184 
Kansas Felony X185 X186 X187 
Kentucky Felony X188 X189 X190 
Louisiana Felony X191 X192 X193 
Maine Felony X194 
Maryland Felony X195 X196 X197 
Massachusetts Felony X198 X199 X200 
                                                 
173 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-60(a) (Harrison 1998).   
174 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-60(b) (Harrison 1998).   
175 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482C-1 to -2 (Michie 1998). 
176 IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7603(1) to -(2) (Michie 1997). 
177 IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7603(3) to 18-7604 (Michie 1997). 
178 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7(a)(1)-(2), -8(a) (West 1993).   
179 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-7(a)(4) (West 1993).   
180 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-8 ; 5/16-7(b)(5) (“unidentified sound or audio visual“ 
defined as without having a true name and address). 
181 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-1(b)(8)(B) (Michie 1998).   
182 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-10-4; § 24-1-10-5 (Michie 1998).   
183 IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.15(1) (West 1993). 
184 IOWA CODE ANN. §14.15.2 (West 1993). 
185 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3748 to -3749 (West 1996).   
186 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3748(a) to-3749 (West 1996).   
187 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3750 (West 1996).   
188 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(1), (3) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1998).   
189 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(2) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1998).   
190 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.445(4) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1998).   
191 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223 (West 1998).   
192 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223.5 (West 1998).   
193 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:223.6, 14:223.3(West 1998).   
194 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.10, § 1261(1)-(2) (West 1997).   
195 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467A(a) (1996).   
196 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467A(a)(2)-(3) (1996).   
197 MD. ANN. CODE., CRIM. LAW § 7-308(d)(2) (1996). 
198 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 143A (West 1992).   
199 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §143B (West 1992).   
200 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 143C, 143D (West 1992). 
334/Vol. XXIV/Southern Law Journal 
 
 
State 
Penalty—
Unauthorized 
Duplication 
Unauthorized 
Duplication Bootlegging 
True Name 
& Address 
Optical Disc 
Identification 
Michigan Felony X201 X202 X203 
Minnesota Felony X204 X205 
Mississippi  X206 X207 X208  
Missouri Felony X209 X210 X211 
Montana Felony X212 X213 X214 
Nebraska Misdemeanor X215 X216 
Nevada Felony X217 X218 
New 
Hampshire Felony X219 X220 X221 
New Jersey Felony X222 X223 X224 
New Mexico Felony X225 X226 X227 
New York Felony X228 X229 X230 X231 
                                                 
201 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1052(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1999).   
202 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1052(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999).   
203 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 752.1053-.1054 (West Supp. 1999).   
204 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325E.169-.201 (West 1995).   
205 MINN. STAT. ANN. §325E.18-.201 (West 1995).   
206 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-23-87 to -91 (1999).   
207 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-87(2)(b) (1999).    
208 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-89 (1999).    
209 MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.225-.255 (West 1999).   
210 MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.226-.230 (West 1999).   
211 MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.240, .241, .255 (West 1999).   
212 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-141 to -147 (1997).   
213 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-142(2), 30-13-143(2) (1997).   
214 MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-144 (West 1999).   
215 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1323 to -1326 (Michie 1995).   
216 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1324, -1326 (Michie 1995).   
217 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.217 (Michie 1997).   
218 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205.217(2), 193.30 (Michie 1997).   
219 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:1 to :5, 352:1 (1995 & Supp. 1998).   
220 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:2(I)(b), (II)(b) (1995 & Supp. 1998).   
221 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352-A:3, 352-A:5. 
222 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 1995).   
223 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21(c)(3) (West 1995).   
224 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21.c(4) (West 1995).   
225 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16B-1 to -9 (Michie 1998).   
226 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16B-5 (Michie 1998).   
227 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16B-4(Michie 1998).   
228 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.00-.30, 275.35-.45, 420.00-.05 (McKinney 1999).   
229 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 275.15-.20 (McKinney 1999).   
230 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 275.35, 275.40 (McKinney 1999).   
231 N.Y. GEN BUS. Law §390-a (McKinney 1999).   
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North 
Carolina Felony X232 X233 X234 
North Dakota Felony X235 X236 X237 
Ohio Felony X238 X239 
Oklahoma Felony X240 X241 X242 
Oregon Felony X243 X244 X245 
Pennsylvania Felony X246 X247 X248 
Rhode Island Felony X249 X250 X251 
South 
Carolina Felony X252 X253 X254 
South Dakota Felony X255 X256 
Tennessee Felony X257 X258 X259 
                                                 
232 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-432 to -437 (1993).   
233 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-433(a)(3) to -(4) (1993).   
234 N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 14-435; 14-437 (1993). 
235 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-21.1-01 to -06 (1978). 
236 N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-21.1-02(2) to -(4) (1978).   
237 N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-21.1-03 (1978). 
238 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.52, 1333.99(E)-(F) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1998); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.32 (Anderson 1996).   
239 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1333.52(B);1333.9(F) (Anderson 1996).   
240 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1975-1981 (West Supp. 1997).   
241 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1978 (West Supp. 1997).   
242 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21§1979 (West Supp. 1997).   
243 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.864 to -.869, 164.873, 164 .876 (1990 & Supp. 1998).   
244 OR. REV. STAT. § 164.869 (1990 & Supp. 1998).   
245 OR. REV. STAT. § 164.872 (1990 & Supp. 1998).   
246 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4116 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).   
247 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4116(d.1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).   
248 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4116(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).   
249 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-15 (1992).   
250 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-15(a)(2) to -(3) (1992).   
251 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-15(c) (1992). 
252 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-910 to -950 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).   
253 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-915 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).   
254 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-930, 16-11-940 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997).   
255 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-43A-1 to -7, 22-6-1 (Michie 1997).   
256 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43A-3 (Michie 1997).   
257 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-105, -115, -139 to -140 (1997).   
258 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-139(c) (1997).   
259 TENN. CODE ANN. §39-14-139(a) (1997). 
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Texas Felony X260 X261 X262 
Utah Misdemeanor X263 X264 
Vermont 
Virginia Felony X265 X266 X267 
Washington Felony X268 X269 X270 
West Virginia Felony X271 X272 X273 
Wisconsin Felony X274 X275 X276 
Wyoming Felony X277 X278 
 
 
 
                                                 
260 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.91to -.96 (West Supp. 1999).   
261 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.93 (West Supp. 1998).   
262 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §35-94(a) (West Supp. 1998).   
263 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-10-1 to -8 (1996). 
264 UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-10-8 (1996). 
265 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-41.1 to .6 (Michie 1998).   
266 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-41.2 (Michie 1998).   
267 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-41.4, 59.1-41.6 (Michie 1998).   
268 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.25.010 to -.901 (West 1999). 
269 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.25.030 (West 1999).   
270 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §19.25.040 (West 1999). 
271 W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50 (1997).   
272 W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(a) (1997).   
273 W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(a) (1997). 
274 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.207 (West Supp. 2000). 
275 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.208 (West Supp. 2000). 
276 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.209 (West Supp. 2000). 
277 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-13-201 to -206 (Michie 1999).   
278 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-202(a)(ii) (Michie 1999).   
